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Abstract 
Many job-losers suffer large and persistent losses in earnings capacity.  For displaced workers
who are age-eligible, one reaction to these losses is to begin claiming Social Security retirement 
benefits. We use administrative earnings records from the Social Security Administration’s
Continuous Work History Sample to study the impacts of labor market shocks among workers in 
their late 50s and early 60s on Social Security retirement benefit claiming rates.  We find that 
labor market shocks lead to current and future increases in the fraction of insured workers who 
initiate Social Security benefits at the earliest possible claiming age.  Moreover, once they
initiate benefits, early claimants continue to have low levels of earnings in all subsequent years.
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Nearly	  one out of three Americans claims Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, the earliest possible claiming age.1 Although	  the early claiming rate has trended downward	  over the	  past 15 years,	  it surged by four percentage points during	  the	  Great Recession	  and remains substantial at 31 percent	  in	  2012. Because retirement	  benefits are actuarially reduced for claimants who initiate benefits prior to their “full	  retirement age,” early claiming does not directly	  affect the solvency of the Social Security system. However,	  the lower benefit	  levels may lead to lower living	  standards and a higher risk	  of poverty	  for early claimants and	  their families (Gruber	  and	  Orzag,	  2003). Indeed,	  the average retirement benefit for early claimants in 2012 was only	  $1,148 per month (Social Security	  Administration, 2013) – just under the Federal poverty line for a family of two. One explanation	  for the	  early claiming of benefits is diminished labor market opportunities resulting from economic shocks such as job displacement. A large body of work	  has shown	  that	  workers who are displaced from a long-­‐term	  job suffer persistent losses in	  potential	  earnings	  (e.g.,	  Jacobson, Lalonde, and	  Sullivan, 1993;	  Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester,	  2009).	   These losses	  appear	  to	  be	  particularly	  large	  for those	  who	  lose	  a job during a cyclical downturn. Davis and von Wachter (2011), for example, estimate that male workers	  with significant previous job tenure experience losses of approximately 20% of their	  expected	  future	  earnings	  if they	  are	  displaced	  in a recession. 
1 Authors’ tabulations of new Social Security Retirement benefit claims from Annual Statistical Supplement tothe Social Security Bulletin (2013), Table 6.B.5 divided by Census intercensal estimates	  of U.S. population age62 by year.
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For workers	  who	  have	  reached	  age	  62, one	  response	  to	  a negative earnings	  shock isto initiate early Social	  Security retirement benefits (see e.g., Coile	  and Levine, 2007).2 Toillustrate	  the	  strength	  of this	  response,	  Figure	  1 shows the fraction of people born from1934 to 1947 who began claiming retirement benefits at age 62, along	  with the annualunemployment rate in	  the years they	  turned 62. While early claiming rates have generallytrended down among later cohorts, this pattern was interrupted by the recession in theearly	  2000s – which impacted cohorts born in 1939 and 1940 – and particularly	  by theonset of the Great	  Recession	  in	  2009 – which led to a sharp rise in early claiming rates bypeople born	  in 1947.	   After accounting for long term trends the correlation between earlyclaiming rates and the unemployment rate at age 62 is a highly significant -­‐0.4.The simple patterns in Figure 1 may understate the long run effects of a cyclicaldownturn	  for two	  reasons.	   First,	  workers	  who are	  younger than 62 but experience	  anegative shock may “bide their time” in part-­‐time	  and lower-­‐wage jobs until	  they reachtheir	  62nd birthday and can file for retirement benefits. Thus, a serious recession may endup impacting early claiming rates for several cohorts – not just those who are	  on the cuspof eligibility	  for benefits.	   Second, to	  the	  extent that people	  who	  have	  started	  to claimretirement benefits face disincentives to work because of the Retirement Earnings Test,labor market shocks that push people into early claiming may lead to lower earnings afterage 62, further magnifying the costs of these shocks.In this paper	  we use administrative data from the Social Security Administration’sContinuous	  Work History	  Sample to study the effects of recent and lagged labor marketshocks on the rate of initiation of Social Security retirement benefit claims. We also
2 Younger workers with a serious health condition	  may initiate a disability benefit claim (Black, Kermit andSanders, 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003).
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examine the patterns of earnings changes associated with early claiming and provideestimates of the impacts of early claiming on earnings after age 62. We focus on	  peoplewho were working at age 57 and not already claiming federal disability	  benefits	  by	  thatage,	  following	  them over the next 5 to 14 years (depending on their birth cohort). Toaddress concerns about worker mobility in response to negative shocks in their local labormarket, we assign each worker their location as of age 57.3Our analysis points to	  two main conclusions. First, there is strong evidence thatpeople who experience negative labor market shocks in their late 50s and early 60s arelikely to begin claiming Social Security retirement benefits as soon as they can. This isevident both	  from	  the downward trend in their earnings	  prior to age 62, and from thestrong correlation between early claiming and local labor market shocks experiencedbetween	  ages 57 and 62.	   Second, once they begin receiving	  benefits, early claimers havevery low earnings	  (typically	  less	  than	  $2500 per year),	  regardless of howmuch they wereearning in the years prior to claiming. Interestingly, the post-­‐initiation	  earnings	  of people	  who begin claiming benefits at age 62 are not very different from those who begin	  claiming	  at ages 63 or 64,	  while early claimants as a group are substantially different from thosewho initiate benefits on or after their FRA.
I. Social Security Retirement	  Benefits	  and	  the Earnings	  Test U.S. workers become fully	  insured for Social Security retirement benefits once theyhave	  earned 40 Social Security	  work	  credits. A worker receives one credit for everycalendar	  quarter	  in which	  total	  earned	  income	  from Social Security-­‐covered	  employment is
3 Yagin	  (2014) shows that mobility responses to local	  labor market shocks during the 2001-­‐2011 period wererelatively small.
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at least	  $1,220 (in	  2015).	  According to the Social Security	  Administration, about	  96 percentof the U.S.	  workforce is now covered by	  Social Security.	  A worker’s monthly retirementbenefit is based on	  his or her average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), computed overthe highest 35 years	  of earnings.	  A worker’s	  Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is apiecewise linear function of the AIME. In 2015, the PIA is 90 percent of the first $826 of theAIME plus 32 percent of the amount between $826 and $4,980 plus 10 percent of theamount over $4,980. The percentages	  are constant from year to year while the “bendpoints”	  in the PIA formula are indexed to annual average wage growth.The PIA is the benefit payable if a worker initiates retirement benefits at the full	  retirement age (FRA).	   If benefits are	  initiated before the	  FRA, they are actuarially reducedby 7-­‐8	  percent per	  year,	  whereas	  benefits initiated after the FRA are actuarially	  increasedby a similar amount.4 For example, an individual	  with a full retirement age of 66 and whoclaims retirement benefits at 62 will receive a monthly benefit equal to 70 percent of his orher PIA.While the earliest benefit claiming age is 62 for all birth cohorts, the full retirementage is following	  a scheduled	  increase.	  Birth	  cohorts	  born	  in or before 1937 had	  an	  FRA of65. The FRA	  for the 1938 cohort was 65 and 2 months and increased by two months forsuccessive	  birth years through the 1943 cohort. The FRA is 66 for the cohorts bornbetween	  1943 and 1954,	  and will increase	  again in two-­‐month	  increments for the cohorts	  born	  between 1955 and	  1960.	  The FRA is 67 for all cohorts	  born	  in 1960 or later.	  Figure	  2 shows trends in	  benefit	  initiation by age for members of the 1934 through1947 birth	  cohorts	  in SSA’s Continuous	  Work History	  Sample who were employed at age
4 The delayed retirement credit has also followed a scheduled increase, becoming actuarially fair at 8 percentper year for the cohorts born	  in	  1943 and later (from a low of 3.5 percent for the	  cohorts born before	  1927).
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57 (see	  Section	  II for detail about these	  data). The most striking elements of the	  figure arethe linear decline in the	  fraction initiating benefits at 65 and the coincident	  increase	  in the	  fraction	  starting	  benefits	  at 66. The shift from age 65 to	  66 occurs	  for the	  1938 through	  1943 cohorts,	  which were the first birth cohorts	  affected	  by	  the	  scheduled	  increase in the	  FRA at a rate of two months per year.5 The figure also	  shows	  the steady decline	  in the	  fraction	  starting	  benefits	  at the	  earliest claiming age.	  Some of the decline	  may beattributable to the increasing actuarial penalty for early claiming that accompanied the risein the FRA, although the figure	  indicates	  the	  decline in claiming at age 62 may have pre-­‐dated the cohorts affected by the change in	  the FRA.	  Since the Social Security	  program’s inception, retirement benefits have beenreduced	  when beneficiaries earn substantial income after initiating benefit payments.	  Priorto the year 2000,	  a retirement earnings test applied to all beneficiaries under age 70.	  In2000, Congress	  removed the earnings test	  for beneficiaries at or above the full retirementage, but maintained the test for early claimants,	  presumably as a device to deter earlyclaiming.	   At present,	  the benefits of early claimants are reduced by $1 for every	  $2 ofearnings	  above	  the exempt amount ($15,720 in 2015) until the	  beneficiary	  reaches	  FRA6;from that point on,	  benefits are	  increased to compensate for the earlier	  withholding,	  at thesame actuarially	  fair	  rate used to adjust	  benefits for early	  or delayed claiming. Thus, theearnings	  test has	  no effect on the present	  value of benefits for a beneficiary	  with	  average	  life expectancy; it only affects the timing of benefit payments.	  That said, until recent	  years,	  the fact	  that	  earnings test	  withholdings are later restored in the form of higher benefits was
5 See also	  Song	  and Manchester (2007) for a detailed analysis of the effect of the increase in the FRA on thetiming of benefit	  claiming.6 In the calendar year of FRA attainment, the exempt	  amount	  is substantially higher at $41,880 in 2015.
6
	  
 
        
          
        
          
           
   
      
              
      
        
       
        
          
    
     
             
               
           
           
                
          
     
          
not well publicized,	  and the research	  evidence suggests beneficiaries have	  viewed	  theearnings	  test as a tax (Gruber	  and	  Orzag,	  2003). Finally, while	  working after early claimingcan result in temporarily	  reduced benefits	  due to	  the	  earnings	  test,	  working can also	  resultin increased	  benefits.	  The	  AIME is recomputed annually to account	  for new earnings	  and ifthe new	  earnings	  exceed earnings	  in one of the years included	  in the AIME calculation,	  theindividual’s benefit	  is increased accordingly.	  Viewed	  as	  an	  implicit tax on	  earnings in	  a static framework,	  the	  earnings	  test	  altersa beneficiary’s budget constraint in the classic manner of a transfer program. For thosewhose potential	  earnings	  are	  below the	  disregard	  level,	  economic theory suggests theearnings	  test has	  no effect;	  for those	  whose potential	  earnings are between	  the disregardlevel	  and their break-­‐even	  level	  of labor supply,	  there	  are offsetting substitution	  andincome effects	  of the	  benefit offset.	  For those	  with potential	  earnings well	  above the break-­‐even level, the earnings test has an income effect.	   The disregard	  level has	  varied	  substantially	  across	  birth	  cohorts	  and	  years,	  and often unpredictably (see	  Friedberg and	  Webb	  (2009)	  for a catalog of historical changes).	  The literature offers somewhat mixed evidence on the labor supply effects of theearnings test, with the balance of the evidence pointing to a modest labor supply distortion.Friedberg (1998, 2000) finds that in the	  absence	  of	  the earnings test employment among65-­‐year-­‐old	  men would be 5.3 percent higher. Haider	  and Loughran (2007) examine the2000 elimination of the test above the FRA and conclude that about 5 percent of maleworkers adjust	  their earnings in	  response to the earnings test.	  Song	  and Manchester (2007)find that the	  earnings	  test only	  affects	  those	  with	  earnings	  just above	  the	  earnings	  testexempt threshold. Gustman and Steinmeier	  (2004)	  use a structural model to predict
7
	  
 
              
          
               
            
             
       
     
              
                
         
              
               
    
 
          
              
          
   
 
          
         
 
                
             
 
          
               
             
     
relatively large effects of the elimination of the earnings test, particularly among those witha high discount	  rate. In contrast,	  Gruber and Orzag	  (2003)	  find little labor supply	  effect	  formen and a small effect for women. Friedberg and Webb (2009) revisit the question usingpanel data	  and utilizing	  unexploited variation in the test from numerous changes in theexempt amount over time; they find that employment following the elimination of theearnings	  test in 2000 increased	  by	  about 2 percentage	  points	  at ages	  66-­‐69	  and	  3.5 points	  at age 65,	  and persisted in succeeding	  years.	  A more subtle issue is whether the labor supply behavior of early claimants isaffected even once they reach full retirement age and are no longer affected by the test.Gelber,	  Jones and	  Sacks	  (2013) find that Social Security	  claimants who suppressed theirearnings in order to avoid the retirement earnings test were slow to subsequently adjusttheir earnings when the disregard amount was raised or when the test was eliminated forolder claimants in 2000. 7 They ascribe	  this finding to the presence of labor market frictionsthat impeded the adjustment of earnings to policy changes. This and related evidence fromthe federal disability	  insurance	  system suggest that there may be a permanentdistortionary	  effect on earnings	  of early	  benefit	  claimants.8
II. Data and	  Summary Statistics Our primary data source is the Social Security Administration’s Continuous	  WorkHistory	  Sample (CWHS).	  The CWHS	  is a one-­‐percent	  sample of Social Security Numbers
7 In 2000, Congress repealed the earnings test	  for claimants who had reached their full retirement	  age (65 to67 depending on birth	  cohort), but left in place the test for early claimants.8 Autor, Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2014)	  find that	  Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)	  applicantswho suppress labor supply in response to strict limits on allowable earnings while their applications areunder review have lower subsequent earnings; they attribute this finding to human	  capital depreciationduring the application review period.
8
	  
 
           
            
            
         
            
           
        
             
             
 
          
        
       
         
              
             
           
          
               
    
         
       
 
             
           
       
issued from 1937 to the present time,	  and	  contains longitudinal earnings and employmentdata, limited demographic data, and the record of benefit	  receipt.	  We use data for the	  period beginning	  in	  1991 and ending	  in	  2009, the	  latest year of data	  available at the time ofextraction.	  Th earnings	  data in the	  CWHS	  are	  derived from SSA’s Master Earnings File(MEF), which includes annual earnings in both covered and uncovered employment fromInternal Revenue Service (IRS) FormW-­‐2,	  quarterly earnings records, and annual incometax forms. For 1978 and	  later years,	  the CWHS	  provides total	  earnings,	  including	  earningsin uncovered sectors and earnings over the annual maximum amount subject to SocialSecurity payroll taxes. Earnings in the CWHS	  are total annual earnings summed over allemployers.9 The demographic	  data come from SSA’s Numident file and the benefit	  receiptdata come from the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR).To identify	  geographic	  location,	  we merged our CWHS	  extract with SSA’sLongitudinal Employee-­‐Employer	  Data (LEED) file. The LEED file	  is a one-­‐percent	  sampleof SSNs for which wage and salary employment was reported and includes an employeridentification number for each employer from which an individual received earnings in ayear and the amount of earnings received from each employer. The	  LEED also	  includes	  employer state and county codes.	  For individuals	  with	  earnings frommore than oneemployer in a year, we used the geographic information of the employer at which theirannual earnings were highest.To measure local labor market conditions	  we	  use state	  annual employment counts(aggregated	  across	  all ownership	  sectors)	  from the Quarterly Census	  of Employment and
9 MEF data included only partial coverage of self-­‐employment income	  through 1992 and full coverage	  of self-­‐employment income	  thereafter. For more	  information about the	  CWHS and related files, see	  Olsen andHudson (2009) and Panis et al. (2000).
9
	  
 
            
            
         
             
            
       
 
       
              
             
         
  
              
              
        
          
    
               
              
    
 
     
              
                
              
              
Wages (QCEW) for the	  period	  1990-­‐2009.	   We use the annual change in the logarithm oftotal state employment as our primary indicator	  of the local labor market “shock”experienced	  by	  each	  worker.	   These data were merged to each CWHS	  earnings record bystate	  and	  year,	  using the location of each person’s employer at age 57 as their state.Our analysis sample consists of all CWHS	  individuals	  who reached age 57 in	  or after1991,	  had positive	  earnings in the year of their 57th birthday, and who reached age 62 orgreater by 2009.	  This consists of the birth cohorts from 1934 to 1947. We excludeindividuals with missing state information at age 57 and those who begin	  receiving SocialSecurity	  Disability	  Insurance	  benefits by age 57. Our final analysis sample includes224,530 individuals.Table	  1 presents summary statistics for our analysis sample as a whole and by earlyclaiming status.	  In the full sample, 52.5 percent of individuals are male, 83.6 percent arewhite non-­‐Hispanic, 9.3	  percent are	  Black, and	  1.2	  percent are	  Hispanic. The samplecomposition is similar by claiming age,	  with only	  slightly more age-­‐62	  claimants beingWhite,	  non-­‐Hispanic	  and	  slightly	  fewer	  being	  Hispanic.	  Benefit initiation among thesampled birth cohorts is concentrated at age 62, with 30.8 percent claiming at the earliestpossible age. Another 10 percent claim early	  at 63 and 4.6 percent claim early	  at 64.	  Thepercent	  claiming at some point during	  their	  65th year i 15.2 percent,	  which	  would havebeen claiming at FRA for the 1934-­‐1942	  birth cohorts, but early claiming for the cohortsborn in 1943 and later who had an FRA of 66. About one-­‐fifth	  of the sample claimed	  at age	  66, which would have been “late” claiming for the 1934-­‐1942	  cohorts but claiming at FRAfor everyone else.	  The percent of our sample claiming at age 67 or later	  is 18 percent.	  
10
	  
 
          
            
           
           
               
             
              
            
            
         
             
           
         
               
          
              
          
   
            
Table	  1 also	  presents mean annual earnings by age, expressed in 2010 dollars	  and	  top-­‐coded	  at $150,000 to minimize the effect of outliers.	  We code those with no Social	  Security	  earnings	  in an year after age 57 as has	  having	  zero earnings	  in that year.Importantly, yearly earnings	  in the SSA data refer to	  calendar	  years, so	  earnings	  at a givenage are in	  fact	  earnings for the year that	  age was attained (so, in the extreme, calendar yearearnings for someone turning 62 in December were primarily earned at age 61).	  Table	  1shows	  that at	  age 57, those who will claim retirement benefits at 62 have mean annualearnings	  about	  19 percent below those who will claim after 62 ($36,427 v. $44,956).	   Theslope	  of the	  age-­‐earnings	  profile between ages 57 and 70 is also markedly different for age-­‐62 claimants compared to later claimants. Mean	  annual earnings	  of age-­‐62	  claimantsdecline by an order of magnitude between	  ages 57 and 63 (from	  $36,427 to $3,127),	  withthe sharpest	  drops occurring	  between	  ages 61 and 62, and	  62 and 63,	  thus coinciding withbenefit	  claiming.	  From age 63 on,	  the downward	  trajectory flattens. Among later claimants,mean annual earnings decline by much less between ages 57 and 62 (from $44,956 to$36,420), but after age 62 mean earnings drop sharply	  each	  year	  until age	  66, after	  which	  the rate of decline attenuates.	  By age 70,	  mean annual earnings in both groups are verylow.	  
III. Earnings	  Dynamics	  and	  Early Claiming Although early and later claimants have similar demographic characteristics, theirage-­‐earnings	  profiles	  are	  substantially	  different.	  In this section,	  we explore	  graphically	  these earnings dynamics and their interaction with the age of benefit initiation.
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We begin	  in Figure 3 by sub-­‐setting our sample by age of first benefit receipt andthen	  plotting the age-­‐earnings	  profile	  for each group.	  Recall that	  earnings	  refer to	  annualearnings in the year of age attainment, so, for instance, earnings in the year of reaching age62 reflect a mix of earnings received at ages 61 and 62.	  The first notable feature	  of the	  age-­‐earnings	  profiles	  is the	  relative	  ordering	  of their intercepts at age 57. Those claiming at 62have	  the	  lowest earnings	  at age 57; those claiming at 63 have somewhat higher earnings at57; those claiming at 64 have higher earnings still, and so forth. This	  pattern	  indicates astrong	  positive	  correlation	  between	  age-­‐57	  earnings and subsequent claiming age,	  thoughthe pattern	  is reversed after age 66.	  A second important feature common to all age-­‐earnings	  profiles is their downwardtrajectory.	   Mean	  annual earnings decline after age 57 for all groups, regardless of claimingage,	  reflecting a combination of reductions at the intensive	  and extensive margins.	  Although mean annual earnings decline for all groups, the	  rate of decline during	  the late50’s	  and	  early	  60’s is steepest for the	  earliest claimants,	  with slopes that becomesystematically less steep	  for later claimants.	  The third and most striking element of Figure 3 is that all age-­‐earnings	  profiles	  decline precipitously in the year of claiming and the year thereafter.	   The two-­‐year	  adjustment reflects the timing of our earnings measures,	  which give earnings	  in the yearthe individual reaches a given age. Consider	  people who initiate a claim for retirementbenefits at some age. On average this will occur about half-­‐way through the calendar year	  they reach that age. If claimants reduce their earnings as soon as they file for benefits,about	  one-­‐half	  of the cut will be measured in the year they reach the claiming age.
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The three groups who claim prior to their FRA (at ages 62, 63, or 64) all show a verydistinctive	  pattern	  of very low	  earnings once they	  start	  to receive retirement benefits. Byage 67, for example, average earnings of people who claim at 62 are $2300, averageearnings of people who claim at 63 are $3500, and average earnings	  of people who claim at64 are	  $3800. In	  contrast,	  people	  who	  initiate	  a claim at age 65 have	  average	  earnings	  of$17,300 at age 67. Early claimers as a group seem to be fundamentally different from thosewho retire on or after their FRA.Taken	  as	  a whole,	  the earnings	  profiles in Figure 3 exhibit a pronounced pattern	  ofkinks that are closely associated with the initiation of retirement benefits and point to acausal link between claim initiation and earnings – particularly for the early claimers. Oneaspect of our data structure that may cloud this interpretation is that	  we observe only theoldest cohorts	  (b.	  1934-­‐1939)	  through age 70.	  Thus the cohort composition of a givenclaimant age group is changing with age. Moreover,	  the cohorts in our analysis	  weredifferentially impacted by policy changes, such as the increase in the FRA, whichcommenced with the 1938 cohort; the increase in the delayed retirement credit (increasing	  by one-­‐half	  a percentage	  point every two	  years	  for the	  1934-­‐1942	  cohorts),	  and	  the repealof the earnings test for people above their FRA, which primarily affected the 1939 and latercohorts, who had not	  yet	  reached age 62 at the time of the repeal in 2000.To address	  these	  issues, we	  show in Figure 4 the	  age-­‐earnings	  profiles	  for the	  1934-­‐1937 birth cohorts only. These four cohorts are observed continuously from age 57 (in1991) through age 70 (in 2009). They have the same FRA of 65, they had already turned 62when the repeal of the earnings test above the FRA was announced, and although	  the	  delayed retirement credit rose from 5.5% to 6.5% across the four cohorts, the credit was
13
	  
 
                
          
          
              
             
             
                
        
          
         
            
           
    
       
               
            
      
            
            
           
       
          
         
still less than actuarially fair, and so all four cohorts faced a modest disincentive to delayclaiming beyond their FRA. Figure	  4 shows	  that adjusting for these	  compositional andpolicy environment differences does not materially alter the differences in the	  earnings	  profiles by claiming age.	   Mean earnings at 57 increase with claiming age as before, alltrajectories decline but at a decreasing rate as claiming	  age rises,	  and all of the profiles	  display the kink at claiming age and reverse kink two years later.	  One slight	  exception	  tothis general pattern is the group claiming at 65; their earnings decline at a steeper rateduring	  their	  late	  50s and	  early	  60s compared to age-­‐64	  claimants. This is likely	  driven by	  the fact	  that	  included among the age-­‐65	  claimants are people who initiated SSDI	  paymentsafter age 58 and who were automatically converted	  to	  regular	  Social Security	  retirementbenefits at 65.	  Since eligibility	  for SSDI benefits is conditional on having	  low earnings (dueto disability),	  the inclusion	  of these individuals among the age-­‐65	  claimants would tend tolower mean earnings for this	  group.	  These general patterns	  are	  not,	  however,	  driven by	  the	  presence	  of low earners ineach claiming group. To see this we next subset our sample by quartile	  of prior earnings,where prior earnings are measured as average earnings from ages 53-­‐57.	  Table 2 presents	  sample characteristics	  by prior earnings.	  As expected,	  there	  are	  large	  differences indemographic characteristics by prior earnings quartile, with the percent male and percentWhite, non-­‐Hispanic rising with	  earnings. The second panel of Table 2 summarizes theearnings dynamics occurring between age 57 and age 61,	  just	  prior to first	  eligibility	  forSocial Security	  retirement benefits.	  First, there	  is substantial persistence	  in earnings	  in the	  years prior to	  benefit eligibility,	  with	  about 42 percent of people	  in the first	  three quartiles	  persisting in the	  same (conditional)	  quartile	  at age 61,	  and about	  52	  percent of people	  in
14
	  
 
        
 
      
         
         
         
              
         
          
             
       
                
        
         
            
         
     
               
            
          
                  
          
 
                
           
                
    
quartile	  4 persisting in the upper quartile at age 61.10 In general, more people transition toa lower conditional earnings quartile	  or to zero earnings	  over the	  pre-­‐eligibility	  years than	  transition	  to a higher quartile.	  Fully	  33 percent of people	  in the	  first quartile	  of prior	  earnings	  have	  no earnings at age 61.	  While substantially	  fewer in	  the higher quartilestransition	  to zero earnings,	  the percent with no earnings at age 61 is relatively high forthese groups as well—ranging	  from 18-­‐20	  percent.	  Among those in the higher quartiles	  (2-­‐4), a substantial	  fraction	  transition	  to a lower conditional	  earnings quartile by age 61;	  thisreflects both intensive margin changes in hours worked and also any wage reductionsassociated with job	  changes (perhaps due to partial retirement).	  The next panel of Table 2 shows mean real earnings by age for each prior earningsquartile.	  These data	  are also	  presented	  graphically	  in Figure	  5. Perhaps most striking	  of allis how the	  earnings	  profiles for all groups—and especially the highest	  earners—exhibitsharp slope	  changes at age 62,	  becoming steeper for about two years before flattening out.	  The result is a remarkable convergence in earnings across prior	  earnings	  quartiles	  by	  the	  time individuals are in their mid-­‐60’s.	  The bottom panel of Table 2 shows how the percent initiating benefits by age variesacross earnings quartiles.	  A surprising fact is that there are only	  modest differences in the	  percent claiming	  at each	  age across the earnings	  quartiles.	  For example, while 36.5 percentof people in the first quartile of prior earnings claim at age 62, so do 28.6 percent of those	  in the	  fourth	  quartile	  of prio earnings.	  Claiming	  at 63 or 64 is relatively	  uncommon across
10 For earnings after age 57, we use extended	  earnings quartiles, which	  take on values of zero	  for those with	  0earnings, and 1-­‐4	  for individuals with	  earnings in the first through	  fourth	  conditional quartiles of earnings.Note there is no extended quartile for prior earnings as measured here, since our sample definition requireseveryone	  to have	  positive	  earnings at age	  57.
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the groups,	  and another 36-­‐37	  percent claim at either age 65 or 66. Delayed claiming at age67 or later is somewhat more common among those in the upper quartiles.To complete our analysis of earnings dynamics and benefit claiming we show inFigure	  6 how earnings	  evolve	  differentially	  across	  groups	  defined by the interaction	  ofprior earnings quartile	  and age of benefit	  initiation (where	  for readability	  we	  distinguish	  only claiming at 62 and after 62). Among the highest earners—those with	  prior earnings	  inthe fourth quartile (Q4)—we	  note the same pronounced differences between those whoclaim at 62 and those who claim after 62 as we showed for all earnings groups combined(see Figure 4). The earnings	  of age-­‐62	  claimants plummet linearly	  from a Q4 mean of$78,490 at age 57 to (nearly) zero by age 63, and remain at that	  level through age 70.	  Among high earners who claim after 62, the decline in earnings from 57 to 62 is less steep,	  but even	  so mean earnings begin	  to fall precipitously	  after	  age 62, presumably coincidentwith claiming. This basic	  pattern	  is present for all four quartiles	  o prior earnings.	  Theuniformity of the pattern is surprising since a priori we would have expected to find themost pronounced effects of claiming on labor	  supply	  among those in the second quartile ofearnings—the	  group most affected by the substitution and income effects created by theretirement earnings test.One way to understand the magnitude of our findings is to compute the foregoneearnings	  associated with early benefit claiming. We first compute the sum of earnings fromage 62 to 70 for each	  individual,	  and then	  regress	  that on a series of indicators	  for benefitinitiation	  at 62, 63 and	  64. We include only	  the 1935-­‐37	  birth	  cohorts,	  so the	  reference	  group is those who start benefits at 65, the FRA for these cohorts. We estimate the modelseparately	  by	  prior	  earnings	  quartile,	  and with and without controls. The controls	  include	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annual earnings from age 57 to age 61 (five variables),	  indicators	  for race,	  gender,	  and yearof birth.	  The regression estimates are shown in Table 3.If we assume the demographic and detailed earnings controls absorb	  unobservedaspects of labor supply	  and the cumulative effect of demand shocks, then the coefficients	  incolumns	  (2), (4), (6), and (8 measure the effect of early claiming on cumulative earningsfrom age 62-­‐70.	  Among those in the first quartile of prior earnings, claiming at 62 leads to a$42,206 reduction in cumulative earnings through age 70. Compared	  to mean cumulative	  earnings	  for those	  who	  start benefits	  at 65 ($103,924), this	  represents	  a reduction	  of 41percent.	  The effect of claiming at 63 is similar,	  while the effect of claiming at 64 is a bitlower (-­‐$34,752).	  Among those in the second quartile of prior earnings, claiming at 62leads to a loss in cumulative earnings of $75,606 or 53 percent compared to meancumulative earnings for those in Q2 who start benefits at 65 ($143,092). The effect forthose in	  Q3 is -­‐$131,437,	  representing	  a loss of 62 percent relative	  to claiming at 65.Finally, the effect of early claiming at 62 on cumulative earnings from 62 to 70 for people	  inthe top	  earnings quartile is -­‐$263,215	  or 59 percent.	  By any measure	  these	  are	  large	  effects.	  Our estimates of the foregone earnings	  from early claiming imply a significant	  fraction	  of people could make a material difference intheir standard of living	  if they recaptured even	  a portion	  of these potential earnings	  and	  allocated them to current or future consumption. An important question,	  however,	  iswhether people claim early because of very strong	  preferences	  for leisure,	  or because	  they	  face limited labor market opportunities. A related question is why do they not return towork	  after they pass FRA, when the retirement earnings test	  no longer applies? We turn	  tothe role of labor market conditions next.
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IV. The Effect of Economic	  Conditions	  on Early Claiming 
One explanation for high rates of early benefit claiming in the presence of a largeactuarial	  reduction	  in benefits	  and a large implicit tax on earnings	  through	  the	  earnings	  testis that	  early claimants have poor labor market opportunities (perhaps as a result of labordemand shocks) and therefore the opportunity cost of claiming is small.	  Indeed,	  thedeclining	  earnings	  profiles	  shown	  in earlier figures could be the cumulative result of labormarket shocks that systematically reduce opportunities for older workers. That said,	  the	  models in Table 3 suggest that the opportunity cost of claiming early, measured in terms offoregone earnings,	  is anything but small, even for those	  in the lowest	  earnings	  quartile.	  Inthis section we examine the economic forces that lead to early claiming in order to	  assess	  the degree to which economic shocks drive early claiming (and the persistence of lowearnings following claiming).	  In Table 4 we present a series of reduced formmodels for benefit initiation at 62(compared to after 62)	  as a function	  of the change in	  labor demand conditions experiencedfrom age 57 to 62 in the individual’s state of residence	  as of age 57. We model the change in	  labor demand as the log	  of the annual change in aggregate state employment (from	  theQCEW). Column	  (1) shows the estimated effect of the change in state employment between	  ages 61 and	  62,	  controlling	  for state and year effects, and fo dummies for quartiles of priorearnings	  (average earnings from ages 53-­‐57).	  The estimates imply that a ten percent	  decline in state employment between	  ages 61 and 62 leads to a statistically significant	  increase	  in the probability of claiming at 62 of 0.067,	  an increase of about 22 percent (froma base of 0.306).	  In column (2), we add the sequence of annual state employment changes
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since age	  57. The effect of a 10 percent	  decline in	  state employment between 61 and 62 onclaiming at 62 is somewhat smaller (0.055),	  but the changes in employment prior to 61 are	  not individually statistically	  significant. In column (3),	  we use instead the cumulativechange in state employment from age 57 to 61.	  The cumulative change is statisticallysignificant and implies a ten percent	  decrease in cumulative state employment	  between	  57and 61 leads to a 0.021	  increase in the	  likelihood of claiming at age 62.Columns	  (4)-­‐(6)	  repeat this analysis but also include indicator	  variables	  for the	  interaction	  of	  extended	  quartiles	  of earnings	  at age	  60 and	  61 (i.e., 24 dummy variables).	  These are included to control for the dynamics of earnings in the period prior to firstbenefit	  eligibility.	  Column	  (6) shows the result of these	  extensive	  controls—the effect	  of thecumulative change in state employment between 57 and 61 diminishes, becominginsignificant. This implies that the detailed earnings controls are sufficient	  to absorb	  thecumulative impact of labor demand shocks on benefit claiming,	  and also lends support to	  our interpretation of the estimates in Table 3 as representing the effect of early claiming onforegone earnings.	  Table	  5 presents two extensions of the estimation results in Table 4. First, we showestimates of models for the probability of initiating	  benefits	  at age	  62, fit separately	  by	  earnings	  quartile based on average earnings from ages 53 to 57. Second, we present aparallel set of models for the probability of initiating benefits at age 62, 63, or 64. Thelatter are useful	  in	  helping	  to assess whether the primary effect of labor market shocks is toshift people	  to claiming as early as possible instead	  of a year or two later (but	  still	  prior tothe FRA), or whether labor market shocks are strong enough to push people betweenclaiming at their FRA	  and as early as possible. In both cases we focus for simplicity on
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specifications that include the change in employment between age 61 and 62, and thecumulative change from age 57 to 61.Looking first at the models by earnings quartile group	  for claiming	  at age	  62 (in the	  upper panel of the table), notice that effects of labor market shocks appear to be broadlysimilar across the quartile groups.	   If anything, however,	  the effects on	  the highest	  earning	  group	  are	  a little larger than	  for the other groups,	  suggesting	  very	  powerful	  effects of locallabor market conditions on inducing retirement claims even for people with relatively highpotential earnings.Next, looking at the models for claiming at age 62-­‐64,	  notice that the point estimatesof the	  effects	  of labor market shocks are a little smaller than the effects on claiming at age62, suggesting	  that about one-­‐half	  of the measured impact on claiming at age 62 arises froma substitution between earliest possible claiming (at age 62) and slightly delayed	  but stillearly claiming at ages 63 and 64,	  while the other half arises from a shift to claiming at age62 from claiming at age 65 or later.	   An interesting exception to this general pattern is therelatively	  large	  coefficient of the	  age 61-­‐62	  employment shock on the claiming rate at ages62-­‐64	  of the fourth quartile group (in column 5 of the table). The −0.63	  effect is about 80%of the magnitude of the corresponding −0.76 effect on claiming at age 62, implying thatamong higher-­‐wage	  individuals local labor market shocks at age 62 induce people to eitherclaim early, or wait to their	  FRA. Given the very large	  impacts of claiming early on totalearnings between age 62 and 70 for this group noted in Table 3, this is an economicallyimportant shift.Overall,	  the results in	  Tables 4 and 5 suggest	  that	  labor demand shocks are animportant determinant of early claiming	  behavior. To quantify the general impact of
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demand side factors, consider the 4.5 percentage point decline in the national employment-­‐population rate in the US from 2008 to 2010. The models in Table 4 suggest that this fallmight have been	  expected to cause a roughly	  3 percentage	  point rise in the	  fraction ofpeople who initiate Social Security retirement benefits at age 62 which is in fact very closeto the actual rise observed in this time interval.
V Discussion and	  Conclusion We have used individual	  Social Security earnings and benefit claim records forcohorts born between 1934 and 1947, merged with information on state-­‐wide	  employmentchanges, to measure the effect of local labor market shocks on the decision of when toinitiate	  Social Security retirement benefits, and quantify the effects of different initiationchoices on earnings from age 62 to 70. A simple graphical analysis shows that the earnings	  profiles of benefit	  initiators are closely tied to their initiation	  date,	  particularly for peoplewho start receiving benefits before their full retirement age. Within a year of initiatingretirement benefits, early claimants have reduced their earnings to an average of just a fewthousand dollars per year.	   This is true even	  for early claimants	  who, in their mid-­‐50s,	  were	  in the	  top	  quarter	  of earners.The earnings profiles of the earliest claim initiators also reveal a pattern ofsystematic declines in the years prior to reaching age 62, which suggests that	  earlyclaiming is in part an endogenous	  response to negative earnings shocks. We confirm thisby looking directly at how labor market shocks between the ages of 58 and 62 affect theprobability of starting retirement benefits at age 62, or age ages 62-­‐64.	   We	  find a relatively	  large effect of local shocks	  on the	  rate	  of benefit initiation	  at age	  62 – large enough to fully
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explain the recent rise in claim rates at ages 62 as a consequence of the collapse of labordemand during the early years of the Great Recession. Importantly, labor market	  shocksaffect the claim behavior of all earnings groups, not just the lowest earners.A key question raised by our findings is whether the low post-­‐claim	  earnings ofearly benefit claimants are due in part to the dynamic incentive effects of the earnings	  test(and other features of the Social Security benefit system), or to heterogeneity in the tastesand opportunities of individuals who claim benefits before their full retirement age. Adecisive answer	  to	  this	  question	  is a top priority	  for future	  research.
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Figure 1: Fraction Initiating Social Security Benefits at Age 62, and
Unemployment Rate at Age 62, by Year of Birth
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Figure 2: Fractions Initiating Social Security Claims at Different Ages, By Birth Cohort
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Figure 3: Earnings At Ages 57 to 70 By Age of Initiation of
 
Social Security Retirement Benefits
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Figure 4: Earnings At Ages 57‐70 By Age of Initiation of Social Security
Retiremement Benefits: 1934‐1937 Birth Cohorts Only
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Table 1: Characteristics of Analysis Sample, By Early Claiming Status
All
(1)
Claim at
Age 62
(2)
Claim After
Age 62
(3)
Percent Male 52.5 52.7 52.4
Percent White non‐Hispanic 83.6 85.9 82.6
Percent Black non‐Hispanic 9.3 9.2 9.3
Percent Hispanic 1.2 0.6 1.4
Percent with Missing State 1.1 1.6 0.9
Age at Initiation of Retirement Benefit Claim
Percent at 62 30.8 100.0 ‐‐
Percent at 63 10.0 ‐‐ 14.4
Percent at 64 4.6 ‐‐ 6.6
Percent at 65 15.2 ‐‐ 21.9
Percent at 66 21.5 ‐‐ 31.0
Percent at 67 or later 18.0 ‐‐ 26.0
Mean Annual Earnings by Age (2010 dollars)
Age 57 42,333 36,427 44,956
Age 58 40,029 32,452 43,394
Age 59 37,616 28,328 41,742
Age 60 34,977 23,604 40,028
Age 61 31,945 17,946 38,162
Age 62 28,221 9,762 36,420
Age 63 20,698 3,254 28,446
Age 64 15,804 2,705 21,622
Age 65 12,027 2,382 16,311
Age 66 8,492 2,071 11,344
Age 67 6,020 1,733 7,924
Age 68 4,308 1,365 5,615
Age 69 3,127 1,050 4,050
Age 70 2,207 791 2,835
Number of Observations 227,148 69,861 157,287
Notes: sample includes people born between 1934 and 1947 (inclusive) who had positive Social
Security earnings at age 57, did not initiate a DI claim prior to age 58. State is obtained from
information on employer at age 57. Earnings are censored at 150,000 (in 2010 dollars).
Observations with no Social Security earnings are set to 0 earnings. All individuals are observed to
at least age 62. Later cohorts are only observed to 2009. Mean earnings by age for ages 63+ are for
people who reach that age on or before 2009.
                      
            
            
      
Table 2: Characteristics of Individuals by Quartile of Average Earnings, Age 53‐57
  Quartile   of   Average   Earnings,   Age  53‐57
All
(1) 
 1st
 (2)
 2nd
 (3)
 3rd
 (4)
 4th
 (5)
  Male  (%)  52.5  33.5  36.9  53.8  78.7
  White  Non‐Hispanic  83.6  78.6  81.3  84.8  87.9
  Black  Non‐Hispanic  9.3  9.6  11.3  9.9  6.4
 Hispanic  1.2  3.6  1.4  0.3  0.1
  Earnings   Quartile   At   Age  61:
  No  earnings  21.4  33.2  19.9  18.2  18.0
  1st  quartile  19.9  41.4  19.8  12.8  12.3
  2nd  quartile  20.6  19.5  42.7  15.3  6.1
  3rd  quartile  19.6  4.5  15.8  41.8  11.8
  4th  quartile  18.4  1.3  1.8  12.0  51.9
  Real   Earnings   by  Age:
  Ages   53‐57  (average)  42,333  11,515  23,999  40,910  81,952
  Age  58  40,030  11,749  23,129  38,906  76,279
  Age  59  37,617  11,296  22,178  36,787  70,874
  Age  60  34,977  10,814  21,008  34,382  65,155
  Age  61  31,945  10,201  19,573  31,556  58,775
Age  62  28,221  9,210  17,233  27,572  52,137
Age  63  20,698  7,246  12,609  19,613  38,523
Age  64  15,804  5,966  9,789  14,697  29,237
Age  65  12,027  4,812  7,601  10,954  22,146
Age  66  8,492  3,628  5,473  7,504  15,604
Age  67  6,020  2,765  4,003  5,222  10,910
Age  68  4,308  2,113  2,924  3,680  7,714
Age  69  3,127  1,600  2,168  2,624  5,559
Age  70  2,207  1,144  1,517  1,838  3,937
  Percent   Initiating Social    Security   Retirement   Benefits   at  Age:
  Age  62  30.8  36.4  30.5  29.3  28.6
Age  63  10.0  9.2  10.7  10.7  9.2
Age  64  4.6  3.9  4.7  5.1  4.4
Age  65  15.2  11.9  15.5  16.0  16.4
Age  66  21.5  25.2  21.4  19.9  20.5
   Age  67+   or  censored  18.0  13.5  17.2  19.1  20.8
Note: see notes to Table 1.
                                    
  Quartile   1   of   Age   53‐57   Quartile   2   of   Age   53‐57   Quartile   3   of   Age   53‐57   Quartile   4   of   Age  
 53‐57
 Earnings
 (1)
 Earnings  Earnings 
 Earnings
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 (8)
  Coefficients   on   Indicators   for   Age   of   Benefit Initiation    (Relative   to   Initiation   at   Age  65):
Initiate    Benefits   at  62  ‐77,412  ‐42,206  ‐109,951  ‐75,606  ‐178,441  ‐131,437  ‐413,803  ‐263,215
 (3039)  (2288)  (2635)  (2083)  (3060)  (2602)  (5753)  (4758)
  Initiate   Benefits   at  63  ‐56,452  ‐41,493  ‐77,782  ‐75,948  ‐130,090  ‐126,177  ‐335,839  ‐280,378
 (4405)  (3213)  (3564)  (2730)  (4156)  (3372)  (8239)  (6123)
  Initiate   Benefits   at  64  ‐42,051  ‐34,752  ‐50,695  ‐58,477  ‐80,347  ‐89,034  ‐228,402  ‐221,172
 (6032)  (4380)  (4829)  (3698)  (5434)  (4407)  (10696)  (7882)
  Other  Controls  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes
  Mean   Earnings   Age  57  10,585  23,236  39,641  78,490
  Mean   Cumulative  103,924  143,092  210,640  448,680
  Earnings   if   Initiate  at
  Age  65
  Number   of  Observations  8,123  10,084  10,469  10,317
                                                
                                                         
                          
                   
                        
                             
             
Table 3: Estimates of Effect of Early Retirement Benefit Claiming on Cumulative Earnings, Age 62‐70, 1935‐37 Birth Cohorts Only
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable in all models is undiscounted sum of real Social Security earnings from age 62 to age 70.
Other controls included in models in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 are: real earnings at ages 57, 58, 59, 60, and 61 (5 variables), dummies for male gender,
white non‐Hispanic, black non‐Hispanic, and Hispanic race/ethnicity, and dummies for year of birth.
                           Table 4: Linear Probability Models for Initiation of Social Security Retirement Benefits at Age 62 
  Dependent   Variable   =   Indicator   for   Initiating   Soc.   Security   Retirement   Benefits   at   Age  62
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
 
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   61   to  62  ‐0.67
(0.13)
 ‐0.55
(0.16)
 ‐0.57
(0.14)
 ‐0.60
(0.13)
 ‐0.49
(0.16)
 ‐0.55
(0.13)
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   60   to  61  ‐0.24
(0.20)
 ‐0.20
(0.19)
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   59   to  60  ‐0.20
(0.20)
 ‐0.13
(0.19)
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   58   to  59  ‐0.19
(0.20)
 0.05
(0.19)
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   57   to  58  ‐0.22
(0.17)
 ‐0.13
(0.17)
  Cumulative   Change   in   State  Employment
      Ages   57   to  61
 ‐0.21
(0.06)
 ‐0.09
(0.05)
  State   Effects   (at   Age   57),   Year  Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
  Dummies for    Quartiles   of  Earnings
     Age  53‐57
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
  Dummies for    Extended   Quartiles  of
     Earnings   at   Age   60   and   61,  Interacted
 No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
 RMSE  0.5982  0.5982  0.5982  0.5674  0.5674  0.5674
                                                   
                                                        
                                                      
                         
                           
                           
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 1 for description of sample. Dependent variable in all models is indicator for initiating regular Social Security benefits
at age 62. Mean of dependent variable is 0.306. Specifications in columns 4‐6 include full interaction of "extended earnings quartiles" at ages 60 and 61 (i.e., 24
dummies). The extended quartile takes on values of 0 for those with 0 earnings, and 1‐4 for individuals with earnings in the first‐fourth conditional quartiles of earnings.
                                 Table 5: Linear Probability Models for Initiation of Social Security Retirement Benefits at Age 62 or Ages 62‐64 
  By   Quartile   of   Age   53‐57  Earnings:
 All
 (1)
  Quartile  1
 (2)
  Quartile  2
 (3)
  Quartile  3
 (4)
  Quartile  4
 (5)
  Models   for   Initiating   Retirement   Benefits   at   Age  62:
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   61   to  62  ‐0.57
(0.14)
 ‐0.47
(0.32)
 ‐0.65
(0.26)
 ‐0.29
(0.25)
 ‐0.76
(0.27)
Cumulative    Change in    State  Employment
      Ages   57   to  61
 ‐0.20
(0.06)
 ‐0.03
(0.14)
 ‐0.24
(0.11)
 ‐0.23
(0.11)
 ‐0.28
(0.11)
  Models   for   Initiating   Retirement   Benefits   at   Ages  62‐64:
  Change   in   State   Employment,   Age   61   to  62  ‐0.21
(0.20)
 0.29
(0.44)
 ‐0.31
(0.37)
 ‐0.08
(0.36)
 ‐0.63
(0.38)
  Cumulative   Change   in   State  Employment
      Ages   57   to  61
 ‐0.09
(0.06)
 0.13
(0.15)
 ‐0.18
(0.13)
 ‐0.07
(0.12)
 ‐0.11
(0.12)
                                               
                                            
                                            
                       
                      
                      
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See Table 1 for description of sample. Dependent variable in models in upper panel is indicator for initiating
regular Social Security benefits at age 62 (mean=0.306). Dependent variable in models in lower panel is indicator for initiating regular Social Security
benefits prior to age 65 (mean=0.541). All models include dummies for year of birth and for state of employment at age 57.
